RECENT CASES
Survival of Actions-Recovery by Administrator in Absence of Statute-Construction of Constitutional Provision Requiring Remedies for All Wrongs-[Nebraska].The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of his minor son, sued the defendant street
car company for negligently causing the death of the son. His petition stated two causes
of action: the first, for the pain and suffering sustained by the boy from the time he was
struck and injured by the defendant's street car until the time of his death five hours
later; the second, for his wrongful death, under the Nebraska death statute. In the trial
court the defendant insisted that the first cause of action did not survive the boy's
death. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Held, reversed. The
action did survive. Wilfong v. Omaha and Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 129 Neb. 6oo, 262
N.W. 537 (1935).
At common law, actions for torts did not survive the death of either party. 3 Blackstone, Comm. 302 (1778); FloridaEast Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, iii Fla. 278, 149
So. 631 (1933); Miller v. Nuckolls, 76 Ark. 485, 89 S.W. 88 (x9o5); Castleberryv. Gulf
Ry. Co., 274 S.W. 1014 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Greer v. St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co.,
173 Mo. App. 276, 158 S.W. 740 (1913).

The maxim, actio personalismoritur curn per-

sona,rested on the notion that the damages sought in actions of tort were punitive, and
that the revenge motive died with the person of either party to the wrong. Pollock,
Torts 64 (i3th ed. 1929); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 Col. L. Rev.
239, 242 (1929); Salmond, Torts § 20 (8th ed. 1934). Today, this justification for the
common law rule no longer exists, because damages for torts are generally recognized to
be compensatory. Sedgewick, Damages §§ 29-30 (9th ed. 1912); Riewe v. McCormick,
i iNeb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (i8i); Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N.W. 607 (1888).
Extensive statutory inroads have been made upon the old rule. Most states have provided for survival of actions for torts to property but have excepted those for injuries
to the physical person and to interests of personality. Evans, A Comparative Study of
Statutory Survival of Tort Claims, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 969 (i93i). And the courts have
been reluctant to permit survival of claims without specific statutory authorization.
Wynn v. FallapoosaCointy Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228 (I91o); McNeely v. City of
Natchez, 148 Miss. 268, 114 So. 484 (1927); Howard v. Lunaburg, 192 Wis. 507, 213
N.W. 3O (X927). The Nebraska survival statute makes no provision for survival of

claims for personal injuries except where an action was begun during the lifetime of the
parties. Neb. Comp. St. 1929 §§ 20-1401, 20-1402. Therefore, in expressly departing
from the common law rule, the court was forced to rely on other sources. In a former
Nebraska case, a claim for personal injuries was held to survive the death of the tortfeasor. It re Estate of Grainger,121 Neb. 338, 237 N.W. 153 (ig3i); see io Tex. L. Rev.
247 (X932); 78 A.L.R. 597 (1932). The court in that case found that the common law

rule "was not needed" in Nebraska under a statute which provides that only so much
of the common law shall be the law of Nebraska as is applicable to the needs of the state
and is not inconsistent with statutory or constitutional provisions. Neb. Comp. St.
1929 § 49-1oi. In the instant case the court utilized this statute in conjunction with
the provision of the Nebraska Constitution that all courts shall be open at all times to
afford a remedy for every party injured in his person or property. Neb. Const. art. i,
§ 13. The court thought the latter provision inconsistent with the common law rule
of non-survival of personal injury claims. A Florida court in holding that a claim survives the death of the tort-feasor has placed the same construction on the same provision of the local Constitution, (Waller v. First Savings & Trust Co., 1o3 Fla. 1025, 138
So. 780 (1931); 45 Harv. L. Rev. 11o8 (1932); Fla. Const. Declar. of Rights § 4) al-
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though a survival statute there provided that such a claim should not survive the
death of the injured party. Fla. Comp. L. 1927 § 421. It is doubtful, however, if
many other state courts will seize upon similar clauses in their constitutions as a wedge
for breaking away from the common law rule on survival. Hitherto, such provisions
have not been construed to create or afford a remedy not otherwise available. De May
v. Liberty FoundryCo., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W. (2d) 640 (1931); Goddardv. City of Lincoln, 69 Neb. 594, 96 N.W. 273 (19o3); Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 1"7, 41
N.W. 936 (1889).
Clearly, the common law rule is undesirable today. ig Calif. L. Rev. 289 (193i);
Evans, A Comparative Study of Statutory Survival of Tort Claims, 29 Mich. L. Rev.
969 (xg31); Finlay v. Chirney, L. R. 20 Q. B. Div. 494 (1888); Hyatt v. Adams, x6
Mich. 18o (1867); Harrisv. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (I91).
However, legislative attempts to make a list of those actions which shall and those
which shall not survive leave much in doubt, and are a fruitful source of litigation.
Evans, A Comparative Study of Statutory Survival of Tort Claims, 29 Mich. L. Rev.
969 (i931). Similarly, decisions such as that in the principal case, which allow the survival of certain actions according to judicial discretion, are partially objectionable in
that they create uncertainty as to the status of other actions not within the survival
statutes. 48 Harv. L. Rev. ioo8 (1935)Torts-Business Visitors and Invitees-Liability of Steamship Company to "Bon
Voyage" Visitor on Steamer-[Federal].-The plaintiff went aboard the defendant
company's transatlantic liner for the purpose of saying good-bye to her friend, who was
a passenger. While on the ship, the plaintiff tripped and fell over a companionway
negligently left out of repair. From judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed.
Held, judgment affirmed; the plaintiff was a business visitor, rather than a mere licensee, and the defendant was liable to her for negligently leaving the companionway out
of repair. McCann v. Anchor Line Ltd., 79 F. (2d) 338 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).
Business visitors are defined as persons on the premises of another for some businesspurpose of mutual benefit to both parties. Harper, Torts § 98 (1933); Milauskis v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n of St. Louis, 286 IIl. 547, 122 N.E. 78 (igig); Kidder v. Sadler, 117
Maine 194, 1O3 Atl. I59 (igi8). The only prior decision involving a visitor aboard a
ship under similar circumstances also brought the plaintiff within this definition and
held him protected from hazards incident to the condition of the premises. Powell v.
GreatLakes Transit Corp., 152 Minn. 9o ,188 N.W. 61 (1922). In analogous situations,
where friends come onto trains or docks to see passengers, there is a long-standing conflict. Some cases have treated the plaintiff as a business visitor. Banderobv. Wis. Cent.
Ry. Co., 133 Wis. 249, 113 N.W. 738 (19o7); Hutchins v. PenobscotBay& River Steamboat
Co., iio Me. 369, 86 Atl. 250 (i9o3); Street v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. Co., 124
Minn. 517, 145 N.W. 746 (1914). Contra, regarding him as a licensee, Galveston, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Matzdorf, 102 Tex. 42, 112 S.W. 1036 (19o8); Hill v.Louisville & Nashville
Ry., 124 Ga. 243, 52 S.E. 651 (195o); Duhme v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 184
N.Y. 404, 77 N.E. 386 (19o6); Arkansas 6 La. Ry. Co. v. Saine, 90 Ark. 278, 1I9 S.W.
659 (igog). The Restatement of Torts has classified as business visitors all those making visits incidental to the business relations of the possessor of the land with third
persons. Restatement, Torts § 332 (,934). While the Restatement and the Federal
court, in the principal case, have taken desirable positions, it is questionable whether
the traditional scope of the term "business visitor" permits its application to these per-

